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Abstract 
This paper’s purpose is an attempt to examine the taxation policies enacted onto international mining 
companies operating in both Mongolia and Kazakhstan (being geographic neighbours) and both nations have 
a similarity within their respective extraction of raw minerals and other precious metals/resources therein. In 
addition, this body of research will display a succinct deviation in one country’s corporation tax policy 
compared to the other; how it has created the “phoenix from the ashes” scenario between Astana-Kazakhstan 
and the meagre resourced outcome for development in Ulaanbaatar-Mongolia. The data will also illustrate how 
a nation’s gathering of revenue, has been undermined due to the pressure from international mining companies, 
which are indeed supported by foreign entities. Therefore, highlighting the differences in policy in corporation 
taxation within two neighbouring administrations. This report will objectively compare mining extraction 
quantities and projected revenues concurrently via confirmed cited testimonials from official governmental 
respected offices of statistics inclusive of the contributions from notable audit firms involved with the data 
collection cum archiving. The data therein would confirm this paper’s findings within empirical validity via 
Standard Error projections within the subject matter’s hypothesis and subsequently determine data mining 
findings. 
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Introduction 
Having both observed the under-development and sparse resources Mongolia’s capital city Ulaanbaatar has to 
offer currently, we must consider the causation factors involved, from both a fiscal perspective as well as its a 
social consideration. This paper will try to exemplify pre-causes and their effects on a developing nation’s 
capital city, which is the coldest legislative base on the planet. 
A nation’s tax revenue is defined as monies collected in form of taxes on income and profits, social security 
contributions, levied on goods and services, payroll taxation on the ownership and transfer on the property, 
and all other monies that denote taxation to be levied. 
This paper will attempt, therefore, to describe its findings in a country-by-country analysis where taxation 
policy of two states, where only one would succeed in a rebirth of a city, the other would show a failure to 
illustrate any signs of improvement inclusive of its pollution crisis. We are all aware that developing states 
could either grow or fail to germinate societally if their respective tax-planning stratagem were to be influenced 
by an external banking entity. Furthermore, Neoliberal viewpoints or paradoxical hypothesis, are merely 
devised for a pre-envisioned globalist-debt controlled nation’s agenda; yet, act accordingly with this mantra. 
Consequently, this paper will display via credible tabulated sources the “pre-envisioned debt control of a 
nation” concept and how it has affected one of the said nation states alluded in this body of research. We also 
must recall “Corruptissima re publica plurimae leges ad”: the more corrupt the state, the more numerous the 
laws (Tacitus, AD c.55-c.117). This paper will also show the results or lack of quantitative investment on a 
city’s infrastructure due to inefficient or dispositive taxation policy laws levied upon multinational companies 
i.e. MET (Mining Export Tax) and other legitimate sources inclusive of Mining Products with sales taxes 
levied. We will see the contrasting issues of these two developing nations and how one of these (Mongolia) 
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has been subverted via external banking entities to legitimize their hold over a nation’s sovereignty. It must be 
noted that there is interference from another NGO of whom is pushing a globalist agenda to internationalize 
Kazakhstan’s Mining Extraction Tax Agenda. “The new legislation re-affirms Kazakhstan’s commitment to 
transparency reporting through Kazakhstan’s adherence to the international Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) standards, imposing reporting requirements on payments from the sector to all relevant 
authorities.  Despite this progress, important challenges remain to be addressed, particularly in the areas of 
taxation and oversight.  With regards to mining taxation, which is handled separately as part of the Tax Code, 
the use of mineral reserves as a tax base, as opposed to the more common sales/profit-based mechanism will 
continue to be a concern for operators, given the potential risk of liability for tax payments irrespective of the 
commercial viability of reserves at any given moment” (OECD, 2018). The aforementioned proposal to 
Kazakhstan’s Mining Sovereignty is more a measured threat of globalist control rather than introducing this 
nation into the international club of world mining. This is still a developing country, moreover, developing its 
own economic infrastructure within its own demography. The companies cited in this paper are Turquoise Hill, 
Rio Tinto (now merged) and Oyu Tolgoi of Mongolia. 
Literature Review 
Initially, since arriving in Mongolia in 2017, it was observed by both visitors and the local populous that there 
was a succinct impression that the nation had made great strides to privatization, notably within the mining 
sector. Overseas mining companies had been investing heavily in the Southern region of the Gobi Desert, and 
employment was indeed plentiful. Objectively, the question had to be asked; Why has there been a lack of 
fundamental development within the country, nor an increase in salary conditions related to GDP?  
To retain one’s objectivity within this body of research, a synthesis of all correlated data from Mongolia, had 
to be in comparison to another nation of which is similar in demography, geographical location and of identical 
underground natural resource (Commodities). Even more fortunate for empirical accuracy, Kazakhstan has 
both near identical resources as well as two international mining entities that both extract materials and 
therefore have operational investments in both Mongolia and Kazakhstan. 
Since Mongolia’s democratization in 1990, the strides Mongolia had made strides within a free market 
economy. This transition was turned this nation into a model for the whole region. As stated in a report From 
Mineral Riches to a Sustainable Future Trankmann, B. (2018) it details how the nation’s Millennium 
Development Goals had removed half a million of its citizens from poverty. The publication also mentioned 
that the Gobi had undiscovered plentiful mineral wealth. Also notated within the overall economic predictions 
was that additional mining employment would increase into the thousands as Rio Tinto (UK-AUS) and the 
government-owned Oyu Tolgoi were to move into the final phases of development; hence boosting Mongolia’s 
overall economy inclusive of increasing the construction sector. 
Previously, Mongolia was very distinctive it had and, in some cases, has insider and outsider ownership. The 
administration was and still is assigned to either the central or local governments, hence the ambiguity this was 
according to Anderson, J. H., Lee, Y. and Murrell, P. (2000). Within the same document the authors described 
in detail both the negatives and the positive implications of this neoliberal policy being adopted in Mongolia. 
The paper cited entitled “Competition and Privatization amidst Weak Institutions: Evidence from Mongolia, 
Economic Inquiry” 38. p. 536 illustrated that State ownership had remained fixed before privatization. This 
was a variable measurement device whereby state ownership measures the proportion of enterprise that has 
been owned by the state itself. Mongolia’s histology was part of the thesis for this study to be initiated. 
A further question to be asked is a simple one; How does a country with such an abundance of wealth and 
future prospects fiscally, has a capital city (Ulaanbaatar) that is famed for being the coldest climatically in the 
world, and more infamously, has the most dangerous toxic pollution on the global index? 
Comparatively, Astana (Kazakhstan) a young city of 20 years of being reborn, has been transformed into a 
mega city, so futuristic due to the revenue received from its mining operations apart from its LPG and Crude 
Oil reserves. One would notice how one capital city of similar resources compare with another i.e. Developed 
and the other Underdeveloped in such a vast way. In relation to this enduring research, a model of comparatives 
was established to ascertain how mineral wealth had been dispersed throughout these two sample mining 
nations so close in geographical proximity. This was the basis of this body of research and intense analysis 
thereof. As depicted in an article via the Business Inside Singapore; it clearly describes how Astana grew from 
a former gulag-type prison camp into a metropolis in a few years (Abadi, M., 2018). 
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Revisiting the Mongolian Mining fabric once more, it is copiously stated in a further editorial by Reuters that 
it had made several references to another report. Bridge, G. (2004), Mapping the Bonanza: Geographies of 
Mining Investment in an Era of Neoliberal Reform, The Professional Geographer (vol. 56). It referred that this 
era of reformation is not a clear indication that Mongolian prosperity could indeed be sustained. Furthermore, 
Deutsch, A. and Edwards, T. (2013), Special Report: In Tax Case, Mongolia is the Mouse that Roared. cites 
anecdotal reforms and measures via both globalization and neo-liberalism since the 1990s especially within 
developing countries which are new to capitalism had indeed expanded so quickly within globalization that it 
has resulted in an unclear prognosis for Mongolia’s future fiscal outlook. These previous paragraphs had 
presented the research with the uncertainties and subsequent material to delve into the depths of operational, 
revenue gathering and financial policy decisions made within both of the exchequers, moreover, to paint an 
empirical framed hypothesis to view why has in-country development is so vast in disparity? Upon the release 
of disturbing news alleging unscrupulous practices in the Mongolian Mining Industry Re: Munkhchimeg, D. 
and Lewis, B. (2019), Reuters. Mongolia, “Overseas investigators probe Oyu Tolgoi corruption claims as ex-
minister re-arrested”. 
When this article eluded to Mongolia is working with overseas investigators to look into claims of corruption 
at its Oyu Tolgoi copper mine (one of the world’s largest) and other indications of abusing power, then the 
premise for this paper was established. Objectively, there was sufficient room to explore what is actually 
occurring in Mongolia’s neo-liberal model of expansion compared to how the Kazakhs had developed its own 
capital city and interior infrastructure, as Ulaanbaatar had and has not seen any form of major structural 
improvement inclusive of the population’s financial wellbeing. Could the reports be correct within Mongolia’s 
Ministerial Corruption Findings, or was it mere politics? As the article suggested, there had been ambiguity. 
“The mine, run by Rio Tinto since 2010, is central to the firm’s push to reduce its reliance on iron ore sales. 
But the miner has faced a series of wrangles with the Mongolian government over tax payments and cost 
overruns…” So, a former finance minister was among the signatories to the investment agreement, approved 
by Mongolia’s parliament. We will see how this case progresses? However, in the meantime data has been 
collected via the aforementioned sources to try to both mathematically prove in the realms of economics and 
public policy, to gather sufficient conclusions. Both nation’s taxation decisions to-date, and their 
implementations were looked into to establish if there was a profound error within certain policies in corporate 
taxation, and what had been achieved in going from profit to develop a nation further domestically or to witness 
an unchangeable increase in a country’s living standards? The paragraphs below display how the data was 
sourced: 
Firstly, both nation’s corporation tax levies had to be investigated, this was via the assistance from the audit 
firm Deloitte, (2018) Introduction of the New Tax Code. Report for Kazakhstan. This was the official data 
recorded from the Finance Ministry of Kazakhstan, which was a logical platform for analytical 
commencement.  
Secondly, the retention of updated accuracy was accomplished with the data gathered in assistance from the 
ongoing publications within the Mongolian government the statistics which were provided by Kiezebrink, V. 
et al. (2018), Mining taxes, “The case of Oyu Tolgoi and profitable tax avoidance by Rio Tinto in Mongolia” 
SOMO Mining taxes, “The case of Oyu Tolgoi and profitable tax avoidance by Rio Tinto in Mongolia” these 
had aligned the data symmetrically as a synthesis to proceed to the comparative phases of this paper thorough 
attributing standard error of the difference calculations. To confirm certain volumes of production and to pre-
select the 12 commodities required for this comparative study, the previously cited paper was very useful for 
year-on-year bi-lateral comparisons, thus referencing for up-to-date mining production volumes correlated 
with the market price. 
Thirdly, all commodity prices had to be factored-in on the very same day Re: 05/Apr/2018 these up to the 
minute prices were conveyed via two reliable sources: Export.gov. (2017), Mongolia-Mining and the second 
data source was: Index Mundi, (2018), Commodity prices. These data miners retained the accuracy of the data 
within statistical analysis models and charted conveying tabulated comparatives inclusive of the data values 
set. When investigating a country or countries taxation policies within the mining industry, nothing is rarely 
left to chance in the histology of data and its predictive anomalies, therefore future mining contracts, durations, 
extraction tonnage volumes, and revenues acquired chronologically were collated via MMHI, (2017), 
Mongolian Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry. Finally, research into Kazakh jurisdiction mandates was 
reviewed within the question “Does any legislation provide for tax stabilization or are there tax stabilization 
agreements in force?” Jurisdiction, (2017), Mining. Kazakhstan.  
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In conclusion, this literature review was to highlight the sources where data was extracted and to retain both 
unambiguity and objectiveness within this paper’s content and its academic conclusions.   
According to the Mongolia Country Commercial Guide (2018) ‘Two mega-projects represent the promise of 
Mongolia’s mining sector:  the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold project (OT) and the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal project 
(TT).  The OT mine alone contains over 35 million tons of copper and 1,275 tons of gold and will likely drive 
Mongolia’s GDP growth for at least the next three decades. At full capacity, OT will produce 450,000 tons of 
copper a year, close to three percent of world output.  Production at OT started in 2013 and is projected to 
reach full capacity by 2025. OT’s $7 billion development of its underground operations will offer ongoing 
procurement opportunities during the 2017-2022 build-up and for the life of the mine’. That being said, it 
remains to be unclear that Mongolia is benefitting financially from its mining activities. The aim of this study 
was to, therefore, arrive at some coherence pertaining why are there two paces of infrastructure development 
within both neighbouring countries even though they share similar demographics and Mining activity; where 
two notable conglomerates operate in both Kazakhstan and Southern Mongolia. 
Method 
The premise of this investigation was to uncover how much a developing nation’s capital city could be affected 
in light of ineffective revenue collection or external forces intervention on controlling both a country’s welfare 
and its eventual development. In addition, the very same multinational companies operating in the very same 
said nations, have been scrutinized qualitatively and quantitatively throughout. This body of research over a 
two-year cycle investigated 12 major Minerals and Metals that are currently being mined in Mongolia’s South 
Gobi region were chosen as samples for this paper. Moreover, Copper Concentrate was selected as a taxation 
comparison barometer to ascertain the deviation between the Kazakh Government and the Mongolian Treasury. 
In addition, the data will also show the actual stakes in the mining fields for each of the two nations cited. 
Data collection was obtained and correlated from sources primarily of the Netherlands, Mongolia, Vancouver, 
and Luxembourg. Statistics were gathered from National Statistics of Mongolia and the latest data from 
Deloitte pertaining to the New Taxation Rates on mining sales inclusive of coal for Kazakhstan with 
projections from 2018 to 2022. 
Delimitations 
The parameters within this research were to merely use the data, which has already been defined, in the public 
gaze and still within the framework of national debate, however: 
a) Data which has not been included, are citations pertaining to in rhetorical nature that is still been litigated 
within both national and international jurisprudence guidelines. Thus, this aforementioned literature will 
not be included in any statistical nature of this draft. 
b) The main aim of the data used is a comparative of a two-nation taxation policy within the difference, simply 
put; an analysis of why there are two countries of similar demography and mine near identical commodities 
inclusive of minerals and precious metals, have entirely varying taxation policy to acquire revenue for their 
respective exchequers? 
c) The procedures and methods that have not been undertaken are elements such as statistical questionnaires 
and direct scholastic/journalistic inquiry via face-to-face interviews (Direct Engagement). This is attributed 
to both the political and legal sensitivities of the issues portrayed in this study inclusive of the author’s 
geographical residency.  
Results and Discussion 
Quantitative 
The data represented below indicates the issues that Mongolia faces with regard to stakeholder controls within 
the South Gobi mining sites with respect to mining multinationals. 34% of a stake in an extraction project 
within its own territory, does not constitute a revenue-healthy environment which is illustrated in both Figures 
1 and 2 below (Kiezebrink, V. et al., 2018). 
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Figure 1. Stakeholders Control Summarization of Mines in Mongolia 
Source: Ownership Structure OT, SOMO. OT (2018) 
 
Figure 2. Overall Stake Controls: Mongolia vs Kazakhstan 
Source: SOMO data 2018 contrasted with Kazakhstan’s data via Deloitte Tax alert Kz & Kazatomprom’s influence: Bloomberg (2019) 
Kiezebrink, V. et al., (2018) 
The key issue for extrapolation is that the data notated above clearly highlights the differences in national 
protection of resources clearly defined with the lesser stake supervised by Mongolia. However, Kazakhstan 
since embarking into major extraction of its minerals under Soviet legislation, it has maintained a stringent 
legal policy on tendering to multinationals. It has completely controlled MET (Mining Extraction Taxes) 
payable on the valuable resources produced, and payable on a quarterly basis. The average exchange is 
determined via the Precious Metals Exchange in London. Moreover, additional payment is incurred: Subsoil 
rental (over 60 Months) No special tax advantages are available to companies carrying out mining activities in 
Kazakhstan. Hence, the OECD are vying to convince the government to follow an international taxation policy 
on extraction levies. Therefore, lowing the revenue for the Kazakh treasury and in turn increasing multinational 
companies’ profitability. 
Mongolia’s future is promising according to the Mongolian Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry (MMHI). 
For example, their data suggests that following as stated: Two mega-projects represent the promise of 
Mongolia’s mining sector:  the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold project (OT) and the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal project 
(TT).  The OT mine alone contains over 35 million tons of copper and 1,275 tons of gold and will likely drive 
Mongolia’s GDP growth for at least the next three decades.  At full capacity, OT will produce 450,000 tons of 
copper a year, close to three percent of world output. Production at OT was initiated in 2013 and is projected 
to reach full capacity by 2025. OT’s $7 billion development of its underground operations will offer ongoing 
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procurement opportunities during the 2017-2022 build-up and for the life of the mine (MMHI, 2017). 
However, we must see a change within Mongolia’s MET to at a minimum levied to 40% from the windfall tax 
which is unfortunately in place now. Exemplifying the current status of taxes levied in Kazakhstan on mining 
companies on the extraction of its natural resources. 
Table 1. Comparison in Sales Taxation on Extracted Resources between Nations 2018-2022 
Country Year Tax Levied Country Year Tax Levied 
Kazakhstan Jan 2018 35% Mongolia Jan 2018 Windfall (Cu) 
 Jan 2019 40%  Jan 2019 Windfall (Cu) 
 Jan 2020 50%  Jan 2020 Windfall (Cu) 
 Jan 2022 40%  Jan 2022 Windfall (Cu) 
Source: SOMO and OT Watch Vincent Kiezebrink & Rhodante Ahlers & Sukhgerel Dugersuren (2018) 
“Law on Taxes and Other Obligatory State Budget Payments (the “New Tax Code”) was developed within the 
framework of the government’s response to the President’s “Kazakhstan in the New Global Reality: Growth, 
Reforms and Development” message and the “100 Concrete Steps” Plan of the Nation to realize five 
institutional reforms. On 25 December 2017, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan had signed and 
enacted the New Tax Code” (Deloitte, 2018). Conversely, in Mongolia, the data below denotes the twelve 
chosen minerals in this study extracted in Mongolian in 2017 in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, as coherent quantitative 
indicators.  
 
Figure 3. Metals Extracted from Mongolian Land 2017 
Source: TradingEconomics.com 2017 Oil Production, (Spot) 
 
Figures 4-5. Other Minerals as part of Sampling 
Source: Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry (MMHI) – Montsame Report. Batchimeg, B. (2017) 
 
Figure 6. Oil and Iron Extraction Mongolia 2017                
Source: TradingEconomics.com 2017 Oil/Fe Production, (Spot) 
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Table 2. Total Extraction of 12 Sample Minerals Resources from Mongolian Land in 2017 
Key:  ͌ = Approximately; Mt = Metric Tons; bbl. = Barrels 
Source: TradingEconomics.com 2017 Oil Production, Index Mundi Pricing (Spot) 
This is a mere sampling of 12 minerals calculated at the US $ rate at 3 October 2018. Consequently, Net 
revenue: $1,262,826,840.00* (5-year period) = $6,314,134,200.00 net taxation revenue for the Mongolia 
treasury. This is evidence enough that the Government of Mongolia would have never required a $434 million 
IMF loan over three years nor the $5.5 billion finance package (Tranche-Based) if they were to have in place 
a Mining Extraction/Sales Profit Taxation system for all the multinational companies. a) The data speaks 
volumes. Especially menacing for Ulaanbaatar is that this finance package is supported by Japan, Korea, China, 
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. This was not good fiscal news for the Mongolian treasury; 
this loan has assigned them to being control via debt. Globalist bankers have loaned monies to vulnerable 
countries to acquire control over their sovereignty, and it has been exemplified here. Therefore, all inspections 
of the Mongolian banking system, Taxation Models and Budgeting will be under the governance of the IMF. 
Subsequently, Mongolia raised income taxes on its small population in January 2018. b) If we were to view 
Table 3, the populations between both Mongolia and Kazakhstan, we would see a marked difference between 
them. Instead of self-reliance on income tax rises upon its population, Mongolia ought to have tax levied the 
Multinationals on sales from its own extracted natural resources from its own land. 
Qualitative 
Table 3. Populations-Working by Country at 2018 
Source: Mongolian National Statistics Office 2018 
 
Figure 7. Populous Comparative 
Source: Mongolian National Statistics Office 2018 
With an advantage of 10,727,554 in working population, from the data, Kazakhstan’s ability to fill its treasury 
coffers could be obtained in two significant ways; with its strengthened availability of income taxation levied 
upon its citizens and secondly from the fixed-rate tax sales-profit policy onto the mining multinationals. c) 
Quantitative results depict a wide income disparity gulf between these two sample nations. d) The 
aforementioned can be illustrated in the physical geopolitical differences in Astana (Kazakh Language for 
capital city) to Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia’s capital city) Astana was named the capital of Kazakhstan in 1997 and 
18 556 698
3 100 000
Materials      
Extracted 
Quantities Extracted 
Units: MT 
& Barrels 
Market Prices (US $) 
Dated: 05/Oct/2018 
NET Revenue from 
Exports of Proposed 
Mining Companies (US $) 
Flat Profit at  40% 
Taxable   Revenue for   
Mongolian Treasury $ 
Silver                    18     1,000,000/Mt          18,000,000.00                7,200,000.00 
Gold                    20   38,000,000/Mt        760,000,000.00            304,000,000.00   
Tungsten                  120              430/Mt                  51,600.00                     26,640.00 
Salt               1,300               35/Mt                 45,500.00                     18,200.00 
Molybdenum               2,000        26,000/Mt            5,200,000.00                2,080,000.00     
Coal             47,000               60/Mt            2,820,000.00                1,128,000.00 
Zinc             60,000          3,370/Mt        202,200,000.00              80,880,000.00 
Copper           150,000          6,262/Mt        939,300,000.00            375,720,000.00 
Fluorspar           300,000            ͌ 440/Mt        132,000,000.00              52,800,000.00 
Hyd. Cement           350,000              ͌ 57/Mt                19,950,000.00                7,800,000.00 
Iron Ore        7,000,000               69/Mt        483,000,000.00            193,200,000.00         
Crude Oil        8,000,000               74/bbl        592,000,000.00            236,800,000.00 
         TOTAL     3,154,567,100.00         1,262,826,840.00 
Country Population Working Population 
Kazakhstan 18,556,698 [68%]  12,618,554 
Mongolia *3,100,000 [61%]    1,891,000 
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has undergone a massive transformation since then. The city is filled with futuristic skyscrapers that resemble 
a science-fiction movie. Abadi, M. (2018). e) In comparison, Ulaanbaatar (UB) is still seeking the investment 
required to replicate Astana’s astonishing growth. Ulaanbaatar dates to 1639 built originally for 400,000 
inhabitants, now has three times this number. In fact, it reached that number by 1979. Since then, it has tripled 
that figure. However, its needed development and expansion has been laborious, due to lack of investment and 
foresight or vision. It is very much the poorer cousin of Astana and terribly polluted. From the results collated 
with correlation, it is evident that the deficit of revenue received in taxation has contributed to the many issues 
that lay in Ulaanbaatar. Consequently, the Mongolian government can only increase income tax onto its people 
rather than levying the mining multinationals; who have indeed had a sixty-six-percentile advantage in stake 
holding. f) Astana’s workforce receives 51% higher salary band than those of Ulaanbaatar. Deloitte. (2018) 
Japanese architects were tasked to build this modern city with affordable housing, however education within 
Mongolia’s entrepreneurship needs revisiting, as many private construction companies in Ulaanbaatar have 
sprung-up building upmarket modern apartments that remain unoccupied due to lack of economic mass 
population’s unaffordability, thus lack of research prior to a building project being conceived. Taking this 
aforementioned data into consideration, it is very much a tale of two cities. The counter-argument from 
Mongolia is that the mines are still developing and no major taxation ought to be levied. However, Mining 
operations have been online for a considerable time. 
Currently, as the cumulative data illustrates that Mongolian Copper extracted from the Southern Gobi Area is 
the only commodity that is indeed subjected to any form of taxation. Therefore, if we refer to Table 4 below, 
which has been modified from Table 2 negating the final column for the proposed 40% mining taxation on 
sales on exports entitled “ Flat Profit at 40% Taxable Revenue for Mongolian Treasury $”, then we could 
calculate the statistical differentiation via the model Standard Error of the Difference, to highlight the 
differences in Mongolia’s taxation policy Compared to Kazakhstan. 
Table 4. Extraction figures published in 2017 with Windfall Taxation and Ambiguous Rates at 10% 
Source: Commodity Prices − Compliments of Index Mundi − Dated: 05/10/2017 – Montsame Report MMHI Batchimeg, B. (2017) 
At the time that this paper is published, all of the twelve cited commodities inclusive of minerals are being 
taxed differently on sales between these two nations − inclusive of policy. 
This paper would have examined thus, determined correlated revenue differences for all 12 raw materials 
mined in both Kazakhstan and Mongolia to correlate this data empirically. As previously stated on p. 54     
Table 1. Comparison in Sales Taxation on Extracted Resources between Nations 2018-2022. The Republic of 
Kazakhstan had signed and enacted the “New Tax Code” Deloitte, 2018. Referring to the p. 54 tabulation, this 
year 2019, all mining companies are being levied 40% on all resources extracted from their sovereign land, 
however, the Mongolian model remains unchanged or in fact, being levied at 10%. If we were to use the 2018 
taxation and Investment taxation levies inclusive of Royalties Ref: “Taxation and Investment in Mongolia” 
(Deloitte, 2018) i.e. Investment Tax =10% and Royalties = 10%, thus, it is suggested the total 20% levies could 
be imposed upon these mining companies to create income for the Mongolian Treasury. 
 
 
Total Extraction of 12 Sample Minerals Resources from Mongolian Land in 2017 
Materials      
Extracted 
Quantities Extracted 
Units: MT 
& Barrels 
Market Prices  (US 
$) Dated: 
05/Oct/2018 
Gross Revenue from  
Exports of Proposed 
Mining Companies (US $) 
Flat Profit at Windfall 
Tax Revenue for   
Mongolian Treasury $ 
Silver                  18     1,000,000/Mt        18,000,000.00 None Specified or 10% 
Gold                  20   38,000,000/Mt      760,000,000.00 None Specified 
Tungsten                120              430/Mt                51,600.00 None Specified 
Salt             1,300               35/Mt               45,500.00 None Specified 
Molybdenum             2,000        26,000/Mt          5,200,000.00 None Specified 
Coal           47,000               60/Mt          2,820,000.00 None Specified 
Zinc           60,000          3,370/Mt      202,200,000.00 None Specified 
Copper         150,000          6,262/Mt      939,300,000.00            375,720,000.00 
Fluorspar         300,000            ͌ 440/Mt      132,000,000.00 None Specified 
Hyd. Cement         350,000              ͌ 57/Mt              19,950,000.00 None Specified 
Iron Ore      7,000,000               69/Mt      483,000,000.00 None Specified 
Crude Oil      8,000,000               74/bbl      592,000,000.00 None Specified 
         TOTAL   3,154,567,100.00            375,720,000.00 
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Table 5. Raw Data from Potential Revenue if Kazakhstan’s Flat Rates were in Mongolia? 
Source: Calculated via Commodity Pricing from Index Mundi − Market Pricing Dated: 05/10/2017 
Table 5 illustrates, if the Mongolian Policy-makers were to introduce the basic levies imposed onto the foreign 
mining entities it would easily finance its affairs of state as Kazakhstan once achieved with the rebuilding of 
Astana with limited pollution and to raise salaries for its working population. Higher income ratios have led to 
sustainable treasury income. In 2019, there has been little improvement to Mongolia’s Mining taxation state 
of affairs. Referring to the data, it is clear or unambiguous to see that even at 20% from a combination from 
Royalties and Investment levies, annual income for the Mongolian treasury could have accumulated to 
$539,713,420.00 in net revenue. 
Scientific Discussion 
Given a statistical property known as the central limit theorem, we know that, regardless the distribution of the 
parameter in the population, the distribution of these means, referred as the sampling distribution, approaches 
a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation confuse the standard deviation and the standard error, 
possibly because the names are similar, or because the standard deviation is used in the calculation of the 
standard error. However, they are not quite the same, and it is important that readers (and researchers) know 
the difference between the two so as to use them appropriately and report them correctly. Biau, J., 2011. 
Therefore, SEM-SD was used for the arithmetic tool within the following process. 
(SEM) – (SD) Standard Error of the Difference in Revenue Acquired via Mining Taxation 
SED  =   √𝑆𝐸12 + 𝑆𝐸22                                                                                                                                  (1) 
SEm  =   
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁−1
                                                                                                   (2) 
SD =  
√∑ 2𝑋
𝑁
                                                                                                                     (3) 
The sum of all data is calculated on Net Revenues if Mongolia adopted the Kazakh fixed-rate model of sales 
taxation. The suggested Mongolian fixed-rate combination of Royalties and Investment levies at 20% is 
calculated to the 40 percentiles currently in place in Kazakhstan. Therefore, the results of the Standard Error 
of the Difference are from the raw data acquired from Table 4’s last two columns to the right. The control 
grouping is divided in .Kz (Kazakhstan) as the control model and .Mn (Mongolia) the proposed experimental 
group. The unit of measure is defined as per million $ in target revenue base. 
 
 
 
Resourced 
Materials      
Extracted 
Gross Revenue from Exports 
of Proposed Mining 
Companies (US$) 
Kazakhstan 40% Fixed Flat 
Rate if Levied on Mongolia’s 
Mining Company Revenues = 
Net Revenue for 2018 (US$) 
Mongolia without fixed flat 
Taxation Levies. If Royalties and 
Resident Taxpayers totals 20% 
were to be introduced = Net 
Revenue for 2018 (US$) 
Silver               18,000,000.00                7,200,000.00                 3,600,000.00 
Gold             760,000,000.00            304,000,000.00               60,800,000.00 
Tungsten                      51,600.00                     20,640.00                      10,320.00 
Salt                      45,500.00                     18,200.00                        9,100.00 
Molybdenum                 5,200,000.00                2,080,000.00                 1,040,000.00 
Coal                 2,820,000.00                1,128,000.00                    564,000.00 
Zinc             202,200,000.00              80,880,000.00               40,440,000.00 
Copper             939,300,000.00            375,720,000.00             187,860,000.00 
Fluorspar             132,000,000.00              52,800,000.00               26,400,000.00 
Hyd. Cement               19,950,000.00                7,980,000.00                 3,990,000.00 
Iron Ore             483,000,000.00            193,200.000.00                   96,600,000.00 
Crude Oil             592,000,000.00            236,800,000.00             118,400,000.00 
         $3,154,567,100.00        $1,261,826,840.00            $539,713,420.00 
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Figure 8. Major Resources Mined with Revenues Calculated at 20%/40% Unit Per Million USD $ 
Source: SOMO and OT Watch Kiezebrink, V. et al. (2008) p. 17, and Biau, J. (2011) Standard Error 
Table 6. Value (n=12) Commodities + Revenue ∑ 𝟐𝑿  Tabulation Unit (Per Million $) 
Resources .Kz  40% Tax Model 
 
∑ 𝟐
𝑿
 .Mn Tax Model 20% ∑ 𝟐
𝑿
 
Silver             7.2                 51.9                 3.6              13.0 
Gold         304.0           92416.0               60.8          3697.0 
Tungsten             0.02                   0.0004                 0.010                0.001 
Salt             0.018                   0.0003                 0.009                0.000018 
Molybdenum             2.8                   7.8                 1.04                1.08 
Coal             1.2                   9.4                 0.564                0.32 
Zinc           80.9             6545.0               40.4          1632.2 
Copper         375.7         140625.0             187.9        35306.0 
Fluorspar           52.8             2788.0               26.4            697.0 
Hyd. Cement             7.9                 62.4                 4.0              16.0 
Iron Ore         193.2           37326.0               96.6          9322.0 
Crude Oil         236.8           56074.0             118.4        14019.0 
Totals for N=       1263.0         335905.5             540.0        64714.0 
N= Number in Study: n=12 
Source: Experimental Group.Mn vs Control Group.Kz − (20% & 40%) Standard Deviation and Standard Error. Biau, J. (2011) 
Arithmetic’s for Standard Error of the Difference: Kz (Kazakhstan) Mn (Mongolia) 
𝐾𝑧:  𝑀1 =   
∑ 𝑥
𝑛
 =  
1263
12
 = 105.25        𝑀𝑛:   𝑀2  =   
∑ 𝑥
𝑛
 =  
540
12
 = 45.0                                                             (4) 
Kz:  SD =   
√∑ 2𝑋
𝑁
 - 𝑀2  =  
√335905.5
12
 - 105.252  = 27992.12 – 11077.6 = √16914.50  = =130.06                (5) 
Mn:  SD =   
√∑ 2𝑋
𝑁
 - 𝑀2  =  
√64714
12
 - 452  = 5392.83 – 2025.00 = √3367.83  = 58.03                                        
The data correlated SD when Mongolia is correlated to Kazakhstan then 𝑆𝐷 =
58.03
130.06
 = 0.45  
Kz:   SEm   =  
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁−1
 =  
130.06
√12−1
 = 
130.06
√11
 = 
  130.06
 3.317
 = 39.21                                                                           (6) 
Mn:   SEm   =  
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁−1
 =  
58.03
√12−1
 = 
58.03
√11
 = 
 58.03
 3.317
 = 17.50 
The data correlated within the error; Mongolia is correlated to Kazakhstan then 𝑆𝐸𝑚 =
17.50
39.21
 = 0.45 Resulting 
data recorded above clearly illustrates that if Mongolia were to implement credible mining taxation policy then 
it could redevelop the country via self-financing from revenue obtained at the treasury.   
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Figure 9. Standard Error Contraction only when revenue Mean increases 2018 
Source: Standard Deviation and Standard Error. Biau, J. (2011) Bell Curved 
Only upon which the data trail exceeds the revenue of Mongolia by Kazakhstan it is evident that the deviation 
occurs as Mongolia’s taxation remit does not match the clear flat-rate tools of levied to the mining companies 
operating within its borders. Individual commodity sales taxation below $100,000,000 of annual revenue for 
Mongolian production will suffer as mining increases, as there is no present mechanism for corporation 
taxation throughout its resources. Even a suggested 20% flat tax denominator could assist their treasury, 
however, there is not any fiscal stability for future operations, as the foreign mining companies’ operations in 
Mongolia, have prospered further by via tax avoidance. Thus, Kazakhstan’s taxation policies have a vast 
advantage over its geographical neighbour. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
It is evident from the findings within this document that the multinationals have indeed opened a gateway via 
the initial tendering negotiations, to merely promise the MMHI employment for its citizens with liveable 
salaries, rather than being taxed according to Kazakh flat rate method which is indeed levied upon companies 
there. Therefore, the Mongolian treasury has not received its deserved revenue from the extraction of its 
national resources, hence its balance sheet is rather bereft of funding to continue the development of its Capital 
City and other parts of its country. The result eventually, was a gateway being opened for the IMF and World 
Bank to initiate external financing for the Mongolian Exchequer, then country fiscal control is complete. In 
short, if the qualitative data is believed, Mongolia would not require external financing and would be deemed 
self-sufficient via its immense natural resources; inclusive of another one trillion US dollars beneath its own 
terra firma. The question is Mongolia has so many minerals, but where is the money? 
If we sought the definition of Mining Taxation, we would re-visit September, 2011. As a consequence of public 
pressure for mining minerals and commodity reform, “The Purpose of Mining Tax was published in Mongolia. 
It stated: While compulsory payments such as “royalties” paid for the right to extract and sell mineral 
resources are often labelled a “tax”, from a design point of view, it is more useful to recognize their economic 
function rather than their legal form. A mining tax is simply the price charged by a country for the sale of 
mineral resources that belong to the country.  The owner of the resource (Mongolia in this case) sells it to an 
intermediary (the mining company) that in turn sells it to customers who use the resource to make various 
types of metals or who use it in their business (for example, burning coal).  In return for a payment, the country 
sells the resource to a mining company and, because the resource it is selling lies beneath the surface of the 
ground, also gives the mining company the right to extract the resource it is buying. The mining tax that is in 
effect the selling price for minerals is quite different from the profits tax (the company income tax) that is 
imposed on all businesses.  The ideal company income tax applies in a similar fashion to all companies so it 
does not distort economic behaviour by changing the after-tax rate of return for some sectors compared to 
others.  So long as all profits are taxed similarly, ordinary market forces will lead investors to decide which 
businesses should be supported and the economy will enjoy the most efficient allocation of foreign and 
domestic capital Kerver. (2011). 
One could imagine the possibilities that could be availed to Mongolia and its capital city Ulaanbaatar. 
Education would be transformed; its infrastructure could be redefined alike Astana and pollution would be 
eradicated forever via new affordable state dwellings for the suburban “Ger” district. This would in-affect 
improve air quality by 70% for the whole city. Shirking responsibilities like education and medicine then 
outsourcing them to the private sector, has been proven to be an unaffordable policy for the masses and 
0
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200000
300000
400000
n=12 M1/2 √(∑x2)/N-m2   SD SE Mean
SEm Contractions on Taxation Policy
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devolution for student development in the face of a spreadsheet’s profitability unless you are a private language 
school trying to both educate and modernize a country’s linguistic ability.  
Copper remains the only Mongolian resource to be taxed corporately today. State control is key to its national 
resources. It is therefore recommended that a fixed rated taxation policy be adopted for the extraction of 
Mongolia’s Natural Resources from 35%-40%. In addition, Royalties and Stakeholder control contracts overall 
ought to be re-visited and re-negotiated away from global banking control entities, thus reversing the current 
influence on Mongolia’s leadership and economic policy inclusive strategic apparatus. Presently, cost overruns 
plague the Gobi Mining Site. If we were to believe the current taxation scandals, Mongolia is working with 
overseas investigators to look into claims of corruption at its giant Oyu Tolgoi copper mine, the country’s anti-
graft body said on Tuesday, after the re-arrest of a former minister suspected of “abuse of power”. Bayartsogt 
Sangajav was first arrested last April and released in June in a probe into 2009 negotiations over the 
development of the mine, then owned by Canada’s Ivanhoe Mines and now managed by Anglo-Australian 
miner Rio Tinto. Bayartsogt, a former finance minister, was among the signatories to the investment 
agreement, approved by Mongolia’s parliament (therefore, giving fiscal favoured alternatives to the mining 
companies in reference to taxation levies). Munkhtungalag Tumur, a spokeswoman with the country’s 
Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC), had told Reuters it was conducting a thorough financial 
investigation into the allegations that would be international in scope. She did not identify with which other 
countries the IAAC was collaborating. The mine, run by Rio Tinto since 2010, is central to the firm’s push to 
reduce its reliance on iron ore sales. But the miner has faced a series of wrangles with the Mongolian 
government over tax payments and cost overruns. Expansion plans will make Oyu Tolgoi, located near the 
southern border with China, one of the world’s biggest copper mines early in the next decade (Munkhchimeg, 
D. and Lewis, B., 2019). Could this be the obvious reason for the lack of Mongolian Taxation Strategies or 
indeed the avoidance of renegotiating a fair deal for its treasury, thus improving their population’s livelihood 
and well-being? 
If we were to believe both the data predictions for 2020: Mongolia is a leading producer of coking coal, copper, 
iron ore, and crude oil, but exports nine minerals in total. Extractive industries accounted for 20% of GDP, 
18.6% of government revenue and 86.2% of total exports in 2016 according to the 2016 EITI Report. The Oyu 
Tolgoi copper and gold mine is the single largest mining project, which should account for a third of GDP 
from 2020. Tavan Tolgoi is the world’s largest undeveloped coal mine. Then from this paper’s findings with 
the consequential outcomes, Economists would deduce that the 2020 prediction cited above is beyond 
unrealistic.  
According to Mining Journal a leading contributor for Mining News, “the 2009 agreement gave 34% of the 
copper-gold project to the Mongolian government and 66% to Ivanhoe Mines, now the Rio Tinto-controlled 
Turquoise Hill Resources. Turquoise Hill was hit with a US$155 million bill from the Mongolian Tax Authority 
in January 2018 and the government cancelled a power agreement for the massive project the following 
month”. It is clear with the accumulated data that Rio Tinto-controlled Turquoise Hill Resources was 
undertaxed with a $155m invoice considering the profits made by this foreign miner. If we refer to Table 2 
Copper on its own, extracted in the 2017 cycle (6,000 MT) had a market value of $939,300,000.00. Therefore, 
what would be the total revenue Net and consequently the amount sent to the Mongolia Exchequer? The 
number values do not correlate with the quantities mined.  
The economic future for Mongolian Mining is promising, only if there were to be updated taxation legislation 
inclusive of legally controlled contract licensing. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has already established a tax 
levying system that caters for its own development funding, but also it has initiated mass reconstruction via 
Japanese contractors. If we were to analyze the mineral reserves below the Mongolian Southern Gobi, then 
one could envisage a prosperous future-referring to Table 7 overleaf: 
Table 7. Top Mongolian Mineral Reserves Projection EITI Report 2016 
Commodities Reserves Unit of Measure 
Oil 2.4                           Billion Barrels 
Gold 591,244                           Metric Tons 
Silver 3,493                           Metric Tons 
Copper 53.6                           Million Metric Tons 
Coal 26.57                           Billion Tons 
Iron 348.11                           Million Metric Tons 
Source: EITI (2016) Reserve 
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Finally, being reminded that thoughtless decisions of our historical/corporate past, and their unfortunate 
applications, had manifested into economic conflict subsequently destroying nations… Surely it is what we 
could do in guiding such civilizations that would, and indeed define us as an intelligent species and as notable 
research academics. These said academics must advise their governments on treasury stabilization of acquiring 
a deserved revenue, in line with Kazakh levels previously notated. From all the data of revenue and negative 
taxation policies in Mongolia that I respectfully disagree with the UNDP’s findings in an editorial entitled 
“From Mineral Riches to A Sustainable Future”. The figures researched in this paper are not conducive with 
a prosperous future for Mongolian Mining nor being sustainable for the future. The UNDP and UNESCAP as 
part of its Sustainment Development Goals stated: Parliament approved Mongolia’s Sustainable Development 
Vision 2030 (SDV) translating the global goals into Mongolian context. The key to achieving the objectives 
articulated in Mongolia’s SDV and the SDGs will be to ensure that the country can transform the growth 
potential from its vast mineral wealth into inclusive and environmentally sustainable development. Yet once 
again, mathematically with empirical consent, the above indicators, do not correlate within research 
computation. Sustainability of a nation fiscally is dependent on that country’s Exchequer’s ability to gain 
monies via rigid flat-rate taxation levies both being introduced and applied to these aforementioned foreign 
and national mining entities. Subsequently, 2030 was an unfortunate cited prediction by the United Nations.  
List of abbreviations 
MET – Mining Export Tax; 
EITI – International Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative;  
MMHI – Mongolian Ministry of Mining & Heavy Industry;  
OT – Oyu Tolgoi: Mongolian copper mining company;  
TT – Tavan Tolgoi: Mongolian coal mining company.  
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